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ABSTRACT
Does Congress have power to deny copyright protection for specific
content? The Copyright Clause grants Congress power to “promote the
Progress of Science” by legislating copyright laws. Certainly some content
may reasonably be viewed as failing to promote the progress of science.
Violent video games or pornography, for instance, may reasonably be
viewed as not promoting progress in science, even though they receive
protection as free speech under the First Amendment. So even if the Free
Speech Clause bars Congress from banning content, does the Copyright
Clause provide Congress a permissible means to discourage production of
that content?
This Article considers whether such content-based copyright denial is
permissible under Congress’s copyright power. Neither courts nor scholars
have considered this question, despite the fact that lawmakers are presently
seeking to control negative effects of specific content. This Article posits
that the copyright power provides Congress that means. The Copyright
Clause’s mandate to promote the progress of science suggests a power to
exercise content discrimination. At the same time, denying copyright to
content would not prevent content creators from engaging in, and even
profiting from, any speech protected by the First Amendment. The Article
concludes that the Copyright Clause provides a constitutional tool for
fixing content-based problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of recent school shootings, violent video games have
become subject to public criticism.1 This raises an obvious question: can
Congress do anything to control the proliferation of such games? At first
glance, it would seem that Congress cannot. The Supreme Court has
recently recognized First Amendment protection for violent video games,
overturning a state ban on their sale.2 Nevertheless, the Court’s holding
does not end the discussion. The Court never suggested that free-speech
protection from government censorship entitles those games to copyright
protection from private copying.3 And copyright protection is important for

1. See, e.g., Lou Kesten, Shooting Renews Argument over Video-Game Violence, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Dec. 19, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2012/12/19/
shooting-renews-argument-over-video-game-violence.
2. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
3. See Ned Snow, Content-Based Copyright Denial, 90 IND. L.J. 1473, 1478 (2015) (concluding
that scope of the Free Speech Clause is distinct from the scope of the Copyright Clause).
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their proliferation.4 Reducing copyright reduces profits, and reducing
profits reduces production. So although Congress cannot ban violent video
games as unprotected speech, whether Congress must incent them through
copyright is an entirely different question—though one with similar
implications.
The Constitution appears to answer this question through the Copyright
Clause.5 That Clause suggests that copyrightable content must “promote
the Progress of Science.”6 Because it seems reasonable to believe that
violent video games fail to promote such progress, the Copyright Clause
appears to provide Congress justification to deny those games a copyright.
To be clear, the fact that the law protects violent video games from freespeech abridgments does not imply that the law recognizes their promotion
of progress.7 This Article therefore examines the Copyright Clause to
conclude that Congress may deny copyright for specific content in an effort
to decrease its production.
Of course this question is not unique to violent video games. There are
several categories of content that, although protected by the First
Amendment, come under scrutiny for various reasons. Consider hate
speech, pornography, or crime-facilitating material. Some First
Amendment scholars have argued for government to control these
categories of content for various social-policy reasons.8 Surprisingly,
though, their arguments ignore a very practical means for doing so:
copyright law. Copyright scholars have similarly ignored the issue of
whether the Copyright Clause gives Congress power to pursue social
policies through a content-based copyright regime.9 The literature is silent
on this fundamental question: does the Copyright Clause allow Congress to
exercise content discrimination in defining copyright eligibility?
This Article proposes an interpretation of the Copyright Clause that
allows Congress to exercise content discrimination in legislating copyright

4. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 332 (1989); cf. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The
Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 45–47 (2011) (suggesting that creators will overvalue works
that embody greater creativity).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. See id.
7. See Snow, supra note 3, at 1479–83, 1485.
8. See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Targeted Hate Speech and the First Amendment: How the
Supreme Court Should Have Decided Snyder, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 45, 45 (2013); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1985);
Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1217 (2005).
9. Professor Ann Bartow has argued that Congress should deny copyright for pornographic
works. See Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 19–25, 48 (2012). She
makes persuasive policy arguments. This Article, by contrast, addresses the constitutional issues
relating to the Copyright Clause inherent in her proposal.
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law. Importantly, this Article does not consider whether the First
Amendment permits such an exercise of the copyright power. That question
I have addressed in another work, ultimately concluding that the First
Amendment does not prevent content discrimination in the copyright
context insofar as the discrimination is viewpoint-neutral.10 Here, I take up
the question of whether the Copyright Clause contemplates such
discrimination, and whether such an interpretation of the Copyright Clause
makes sense as a matter of constitutional policy.
In Part II, I examine the text of the Copyright Clause as well as its
treatment by Congress and the Judiciary. The text of that Clause provides
support for content discrimination: the Clause premises Congress’s power
on promoting “the Progress of Science,”11 and Progress suggests a power
to determine which copyrightable content will effect advancements and
improvements in knowledge.12 Additionally, congressional history provides
limited support for this interpretation; specifically, the Copyright Act
designates criteria for copyright eligibility that requires content
examination.13 Supreme Court case law lends only minimal support for the
interpretation, although the case law certainly does not preclude it: in
particular, a 1903 Supreme Court decision—Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co.14—dealing with copyright eligibility is consistent with
the interpretation, and statements by the modern Court in Golan v. Holder15
and Eldred v. Ashcroft16 may be construed either way, supporting or
opposing the interpretation.17
In Part III, I consider policy reasons for and against this interpretation
of the Copyright Clause. I recite two reasons in support of the
interpretation.18 First, Congress has a collective perspective that individuals
lack in assessing content value.19 This is particularly relevant because the
purpose of the copyright power is to serve a collective end—namely,
promoting the progress of science.20 Second, Congress has institutional
means that can minimize wasteful effects of the copyright monopoly.21
Such wasteful effects often depend on the particular content under
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See Snow, supra note 3, at 1489.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); discussion infra Part II.B.
188 U.S. 239, 250–52 (1903).
132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012).
537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).
See discussion infra Part II.C.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; discussion infra Part III.A.1.
See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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consideration.22 Lastly, I discuss policy arguments against the
interpretation: specifically, an untrustworthy Congress, industry capture,
and the subjective nature of identifying value in expression.23 Recognizing
merit in these arguments, I nevertheless conclude that they do not counsel
against a content-based interpretation of the Copyright Clause.
In Part IV, I consider two examples of content for which Congress
might prospectively deny copyright—violent video games and
pornography. I briefly summarize policy arguments specific to those
examples which might suggest or discourage the denial. I then analyze the
constitutionality of their respective denials.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
Congress’s copyright power derives from the Intellectual Property
Clause. That Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”24
With respect to copyright law specifically, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the following language from the Intellectual Property Clause as
representing Congress’s copyright power (as distinct from its patent
power): “To promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings . . . .”25 The quoted language is referred to as the Copyright
Clause, which is part of the Intellectual Property Clause.26
Like all powers of Congress, the copyright power is discretionary:
Congress may choose to promote the progress of science through the means
of extending copyright.27 The issue that this part examines is the scope of
discretion that this power affords Congress.28 On the one hand, the

22. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
23. See discussion infra Part III.B.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. Id.
26. The modern Supreme Court has construed the initial phrase, “To promote the Progress of
Science,” as corresponding to Congress’s copyright power. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888
(2012) (“Perhaps counterintuitively for the contemporary reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied
to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts.”).
27. See id. at 903–04.
28. It might be argued that my interpretation of the Copyright Clause incorrectly infers a
negative power to deny copyright from the Clause’s affirmative power to grant copyright. The power to
grant does not imply a power to take away. This argument, however, misrepresents my interpretation of
the Clause. My interpretation does not recognize a power to deny copyright to authors who have already
received a copyright, but rather to prospectively change eligibility criteria. In short, denying copyright
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discretion may be narrow, such that Congress has only a binary choice in
exercising the power: namely, the choice of whether to extend copyright to
all original content or none whatsoever. On the other hand, the discretion
may be broad, such that Congress may choose among categories of content
in deciding whether to extend copyright protection, and for that matter,
how much protection to extend. This part argues for the latter
interpretation—a broad discretionary power that allows Congress to engage
in content discrimination in extending copyright.
Section A interprets the text of the Copyright Clause to suggest the
latter interpretation. Section B recites the history of Congress in further
support. Section C analyzes Supreme Court precedent that indirectly
addresses the issue.
A. Textual Interpretation
This section interprets the Copyright Clause as suggesting that
Congress has constitutional discretion to determine copyrightable
categories of content, and at the same time, that courts have power to
restrain that discretion. In offering this interpretation, I divide the
Copyright Clause into two distinct phrases for ease of identification: the
first phrase is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science,” which I refer to as
the Progress Clause; the second phrase is “by securing for limited Times to
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings,” which I refer
to as the Writings Clause.29 Subsection 1 argues that in view of the
Writings Clause, the Progress Clause must grant Congress discretion to
determine content eligibility for copyright. Subsection 2 argues that the
discretionary power of Congress follows from the meaning of Progress.
Subsection 3 argues that the meaning of Science suggests the judicial
power to restrain that discretion.
1. The Progress Clause as a Meaningful Power
The Supreme Court and several scholars have recognized that the
language in the Progress Clause—“[t]o promote the Progress of Science”—
represents a grant of power.30 So as a grant of power, the Progress Clause
involves Congress refraining from exercising its power; it does not involve Congress exercising a
negative power.
29. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–8 (1966); WILLIAM F. PATRY, 2
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:9 (2014); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:
Promoting Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771,
1810–16 (2006); Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking Constitutional Indifference to
Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Regressing Progress];
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must contain a power that Congress could not otherwise perform under the
Writings Clause. That is, instead of giving Congress power to “secur[e] for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings,” the Constitution gives Congress the power to “promote the
Progress of Science.”31 Why? What is the power in the Progress Clause that
is distinct from the Writings Clause? The answer is simple: the Progress
Clause gives Congress power to direct the means designated in the
Writings Clause toward the end of the copyright power designated in the
Progress Clause. Congress has power to determine the best way to use
copyright in order to effectuate progress in science. And on the assumption
that “the Progress of Science” suggests a content-based end (which
assumption I explore in Subsection 2 below), the power within the Progress
Clause appears to include a power to direct authors toward content that
promotes progress in science. Thus, as distinct from the Writings Clause,
the Progress Clause appears to give Congress authority to direct authors
toward certain content.
The strength of this interpretation becomes evident when considering
the contrary interpretation. The contrary interpretation would deny
Congress the power to discriminate among content in extending copyright.
Such an interpretation would suggest that the Progress Clause is
unnecessary. That is, the Progress Clause would not grant any power to
Congress that the Writings Clause did not already provide—meaning that a
power to secure exclusive rights to authors of writings would be sufficient
for Congress to extend copyright to all original content, leaving the phrase
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science” as unnecessary surplusage.32 Hence,
if the Progress Clause does actually grant a power to Congress, it must
provide Congress the discretion to direct the means contained in the
Writings Clause.
In addition to making the Progress Clause seem unnecessary, the
contrary interpretation would suggest the absence of the very power
specified in the Progress Clause. If Congress could only copyright all
content, Congress’s power would amount to a power to promote an
increase in the output of any and all original expression. Yet more
expression does not necessarily lead to progress in science. Defamatory
content, for instance, may be highly creative but entirely false—not likely
to lead to progress in science. More is not always better. Indeed, more
content that is false, that is harmful, or perhaps simply distracting, could
Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2002).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32. See id. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect . . . .”).
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lead to regress in science.33 If Congress can only copyright all content,
Congress would be impotent to stop such a regress. Therefore, interpreting
the Copyright Clause as compelling Congress to extend copyright to all
categories of content suggests the absence of a power that enables Congress
to promote progress in science.
Of course these arguments rely on the premise that the Progress Clause
is in fact a grant of power and not merely a meaningless preamble that
introduces the actual power in the remaining Writings Clause. Although
some courts and commentators have—without any reasoned analysis—
labeled the Progress Clause as a preamble in the Copyright Clause, none
have asserted that the phrase fails to grant power.34 Those courts and
commentators have simply argued that the Progress Clause does not
restrain Congress. Moreover, Professor Lawrence Solum has argued that
the grammatical structure in all the powers granted to Congress under
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution implies that “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science” is a grant of power.35 He has concluded that “the
promotion of science is the power granted and the securing of exclusive
rights operates as a limitation on the means that may be used in employing
this power.”36 Professor William Patry has agreed with this conclusion,
relying on the constitutional principle that every word of the Constitution
must have meaning.37 Given the arguments that others, and I, have made
elsewhere on this issue concerning the Progress Clause as a grant of power,
I do not address it here.38 I merely observe that my argument that Progress

33. See Snow, supra note 30, at 42–46.
34. See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument that
“the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power”);
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir. 1985) (“We agree
with Professor Nimmer that although the promotion of artistic and scientific creativity and the benefits
flowing therefrom to the public are purposes of the Copyright Clause, those purposes do not limit
Congress’s power to legislate in the field of copyright.”); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] at 1-88.19–1-88.20 (2011) (“[T]he phrase ‘To promote the progress
of science and useful arts . . . ’ must be read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the
purpose of the power but not in limitation of its exercise.” (footnotes omitted)); Scott M. Martin, The
Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright
Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 299 (2002) (construing “promote the Progress of Science” as
indicating mere purpose without any limiting force on the actual power).
35. See Solum, supra note 30, at 12–25.
36. Id. at 23.
37. 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:9 (characterizing the preambular construction as an “absurd”
approach that serves only to “render [the Progress Clause] meaningless, the equivalent of mottos on
license plates; that is contrary to the general theory of interpretation that insists on giving every word
meaning” and noting that “[n]o clause in Article I, Section 8 has a preamble”).
38. See Snow, supra note 30, at 42–46; Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright
Clause, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 276–306 (2013). In addition to me, Professors Lawrence Solum,
Dotan Oliar, and William Patry have advocated the non-preambular interpretation. See 2 PATRY, supra
note 30, § 3:9; Oliar, supra note 30, at 1810–16; Solum, supra note 30, at 12–25.
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gives content-based discretion to Congress relies on the premise that the
initial Progress Clause of the Copyright Clause represents a grant of power
to Congress.
2. Progress as Suggesting Congressional Discretion
The argument that Congress has discretion to determine whether
specific content is eligible for copyright draws support from the meaning of
Progress. The Progress Clause sets forth the purpose of copyright as
promoting “the Progress of Science.” In the subparts below, I argue that
Progress in that context means an improvement or advancement in
knowledge. If that meaning is correct, it implies that some knowledge is
qualitatively better than other knowledge. That is to say, some knowledge
is to be considered an improvement or advancement as compared to other
knowledge. So, if Congress has power to promote progress—improvements
and advancements in knowledge—then it would seem that Congress has
power to promote some knowledge over other knowledge. Stated
differently, Progress as an improvement or advancement in knowledge
suggests that Congress has power to target which sort of knowledge it will
promote. Congress, then, would have power to exercise content-based
discrimination in order to achieve progress.
One might argue that even if Progress means improvement or
advancement in knowledge, the ultimate realization of progress turns on the
public’s preference for content, rather than on the whims of Congress.
Under this argument, the public would decide whether content effectuates
progress in the course of the public’s choosing which content to consume.
Such an interpretation would not leave Congress room to discriminate in
extending copyright. The public would decide progress.
This argument, however, is unpersuasive as a matter of constitutional
interpretation. The phrase “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science” indicates that the power of promoting progress is
given to Congress—not to the public.39 Moreover, as a general matter,
where a constitutional grant of power to Congress includes a term that
contemplates different means of application, Congress is given discretion
to judge the best means to apply that term.40 Only a rational-basis review
by the Judiciary restrains Congress’s discretion in exercising power under
such a broad term.41 For instance, consider Congress’s discretion under the
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8 (emphasis added).
40. See generally United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (“[W]e look to see
whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a
constitutionally enumerated power.”).
41. See generally id.
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General Welfare Clause.42 Congress determines the best means to provide
for general welfare—not the public. Indeed, if that Clause were construed
so that the application of general welfare were left to the public rather than
to Congress (which construction would be analogous to interpreting the
Copyright Clause in a way that the application of progress were left to the
public), then Congress would only be able to provide cash subsidies to the
public; only then would the public be able to decide which expenditures
provide for the general welfare. But of course this cannot be. Congress—
not the public—determines which expenditures will best provide for the
general welfare. Accordingly, Congress—not the public—determines
which expression will best promote the progress of science.43
Thus, to the extent that the Progress Clause allows for qualitative
judgments, Congress must make them.44 More specifically, the meaning of
Progress as improvements and advancements in knowledge—a contentbased end45—appears to vest Congress with discretion to determine which
categories of content will fulfill that end. Some commentators, however,
have interpreted Progress of Science in a way that suggests that the
copyright power enables Congress only to increase the output of
expression, rather than to seek qualitatively superior content.46 This
interpretation I reject. The subsections below present and respond to this
interpretation.

42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
43. See generally Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937) (holding that spending power
implies broad discretionary power for Congress and that general welfare has a dynamic meaning).
Examples abound of Congress exercising discretion under broad terms of its constitutional grant. For
instance, Congress has exercised discretion under its tax power to penalize citizens who fail to obtain
health insurance, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–95 (2012), and
under its commerce power to protect threatened wildlife, see San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v.
Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2011). Public opinion on a particular issue does not change
the validity of Congress’s exercise of judgment under a broad term. See, e.g., 57% View Health Care
Law Unfavorably, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (July 28, 2014), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_
content/archive/health_care_update_archive/july_2014/57_view_health_care_law_unfavorably.
44. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250–52 (1903) (recognizing
congressional choice to deny copyright to “prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of
manufacture,” while construing the discriminatory term fine arts for pictorial illustrations as giving too
much discretion to judges).
45. See generally C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV.
891, 923 (2002). (“[C]opyright has a content-based purpose, specifically good or more valued
content.”).
46. See Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The Copyright
Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2002); Malla Pollack,
What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001).
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a. Commentators on Progress
There are two positions in the academic literature on the meaning of
Progress in the Copyright Clause. Professor Laurence Solum has construed
Progress to mean “advances in learning,” such that “[t]o ‘promote the
Progress of Science’ would be to encourage the advancement of science
or . . . scientific activity.”47 This construction implies, according to
Professor Solum, a “focus on the results of scientific activity.”48 I refer to
this interpretation as the advancement interpretation. Its followers include
Professor Jeanne Fromer,49 Professor William Patry,50 and historian
Edward Walterscheid.51 Professor Patry echoes the point that the
advancement interpretation “focuses on encouraging particular results,”
and specifically on “what the public will learn.”52 Professor Fromer
observes that the advancement interpretation entails an improvement in
either the quantity or the quality of knowledge.53
The contrary position is that Progress means a physical movement,
spread, or distribution of knowledge.54 Professor Malla Pollack has
articulated this examination based, in large part, on her examination of the
eighteenth-century editions of the Pennsylvania Gazette.55 Her
interpretation rejects both a quantitative and qualitative advancement in
knowledge, and it is thereby inconsistent with the advancement
interpretation.56 I refer to her interpretation as the spread interpretation. Its
followers include Professor Thomas Lee and Senator Orrin Hatch.57
The spread interpretation appears problematic because it does not
account for the specific context surrounding Progress within the Copyright
Clause—namely, its description of science.58 Pollack appears correct,
47. Solum, supra note 30, at 45.
48. Id. at 45–46.
49. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J.
1329, 1373–74 (2012).
50. 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6.
51. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 44 IDEA 331, 374 (2004).
52. 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6.
53. Fromer, supra note 49, at 1373.
54. Pollack, supra note 46, at 809.
55. See id. at 798–803.
56. Id. at 788–89.
57. Hatch & Lee, supra note 46, at 8–10 & n.42 (agreeing with Professor Pollack’s spread
interpretation of Progress).
58. See 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6 (noting this problem with the spread interpretation).
Pollack also dismisses well-respected lexicographers of the time. See Pollack, supra note 46, at 796–97.
She rejects Samuel Johnson on the grounds that he was “upper class and inherently English—as
opposed to American.” See id. at 797. She rejects Noah Webster as unreliable because he published his
dictionary fifty years after the convention, despite the fact that he was a contemporary of the Framers
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though, in her assertion that the Pennsylvania Gazette more often employed
the word progress to mean physical movement, with the most common
occurrence being the “progress of a fire.”59 Likewise, Lee and Hatch appear
correct that in a Federalist Paper, Alexander Hamilton meant physical
movement when discussing the progress of travel through a field.60 The
Copyright Clause, however, does not give Congress power to promote the
progress of fire or travel.61 It gives Congress the power to promote the
progress of science.62 As discussed in the subsection below, this context of
science indicates a meaning of Progress suggesting the advancement
interpretation over the spread interpretation.63
b. Evidence of the Meaning of Progress
The literature setting forth the advancement interpretation has evinced
little textual or historical evidence suggesting that interpretation.64 Yet such
evidence does exist. Dictionary definitions of the time, the legislative
history of the Copyright Clause, and writings of James Madison make clear
that the advancement interpretation best reflects the meaning of Progress in
the Copyright Clause. Because of the contrary scholarship on this point,
and because the meaning of Progress is essential to my argument, I provide
this historical evidence in the three subsections below.
i.

Dictionary Meaning

Before analyzing dictionary entries, I should note that lexicographers at
the time of the Framing did not usually list entries in order of most

and had a keen interest in copyright prior to the constitutional convention. Compare id., with HARRY R.
WARFEL, NOAH WEBSTER: SCHOOLMASTER TO AMERICA 53–59 (1936).
59. See Pollack, supra note 46, at 799. This makes sense for a newspaper, such as the
Pennsylvania Gazette, that is attempting to objectively portray factual events, as opposed to
commenting on qualitative advancements of abstract subjects such as science and knowledge.
60. See Hatch & Lee, supra note 46, at 9 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
62. Id.
63. Other objections to the spread interpretation may be found in the works of Professors Patry
and Solum. See 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6; Solum, supra note 30, at 46.
64. Scholarship adopting the advancement position has recited minimal historical evidence to
support the meaning, perhaps because it is so evident from the context of the Copyright Clause. In a
single sentence, Walterscheid observed the similarity between the Copyright Clause and one of the
proposals of Madison that employed the word advancement. See Walterscheid, supra note 51, at 376.
Professor Solum relied on one of the definitions for progress in the Oxford English Dictionary, but he
did not fully explain his reason for choosing that particular definition, other than “the context of the
Intellectual Property Clause” suggesting it. Solum, supra note 30, at 45. Professors Patry and Fromer
cite no historical evidence. See 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6; Fromer, supra note 49, at 1373–74.
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common usage.65 So rather than assuming that the first entry of a dictionary
reflects the meaning of Progress in the Copyright Clause, I search for
entries that suggest how Progress would describe Science, as in the phrase,
“the Progress of Science.”66 As discussed below, dictionaries at the time of
the Framing indicate that the meaning of Progress in the Copyright Clause
is an advancement or improvement in knowledge or intellect.
The most authoritative dictionary at the time of the Framing is arguably
Dr. Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language.67 His dictionary
employs five entries to define progress.68 Of the five entries, only one
references knowledge or intellectual activity.69 That entry states:
“intellectual improvement; advancement in knowledge; proficience.”70 This
entry is the most applicable to the meaning of Progress in the Copyright
Clause because intellectual activity and knowledge correspond to the
meaning of Science in that Clause.71 Therefore, “intellectual improvement;
advancement in knowledge; proficience” appears the most likely entry in
Dr. Johnson’s dictionary that corresponds to the meaning of Progress in the
Copyright Clause: the entry’s reference to knowledge and intellect refer to
the same sort of subject matter that Progress describes in the Clause—
namely, science.
Noah Webster’s definition of progress is also noteworthy given that he
was a contemporary of the Framers who, prior to the Constitutional
Convention, had been an ardent copyright advocate in the colonies.72 This
fact suggests that at the time that he wrote his dictionary in 1828, he would
have been aware of the significance of the meaning of progress as it relates
to the Copyright Clause. Webster’s dictionary employs six entries to define
65. See, e.g., 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE preface at 6
(London, J.F. & C. Rivington, 7th ed. 1785) (explaining that words are listed in order of progress in
meaning, passing from its primitive to its remote and accidental meanings).
66. But see Hatch & Lee, supra note 46, at 8 & n.36 (citing only the first two entries of the four
in Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, and the first two entries of the five in Johnson’s 1773 Dictionary,
without explaining any reason for preferring the first two entries in either case).
67. See 1 JOHNSON, supra note 65 (unpaginated). The Supreme Court regularly relies on Dr.
Johnson’s Dictionary. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008); Dep’t of
Commerce v. U.S. House of Reps., 525 U.S. 316, 347 (1999).
68. See 2 JOHNSON, supra note 65 (unpaginated).
69. See id. The five entries are:
1. Course; procession; passage.
2. Advancement; motion forward.
3. Intellectual improvement; advancement in knowledge; proficience.
4. Removal from one place to another.
5. A journey of State; a circuit.
Id.
70. Id.
71. See Snow, supra note 38, at 306.
72. See WARFEL, supra note 58, at 53–59.
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progress.73 Of the six entries, only one references knowledge—again, the
subject matter of Science in the Copyright Clause.74 That entry states:
“Advance in knowledge; intellectual or moral improvement; proficiency.”75
Like Dr. Johnson’s dictionary, Webster’s reference to knowledge in only
one entry suggests that the meaning of Progress in the Copyright Clause
corresponds to an advance in knowledge, or intellectual or moral
improvement.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) indicates the same meaning at
the time of the Framing.76 Among its many definitions for progress, it
provides the following: “Advancement to a further or higher stage, or to
further or higher stages successively; growth; development, usually to a
better state or condition; improvement; an instance of this.”77 Under this
definition, it cites as an example of this meaning a use by Benjamin
Franklin: “The rapid Progress true Science now makes, occasions my
regretting sometimes that I was born so soon.”78 The statement provides
meaning for progress within the context of science, and the statement is
made by an influential Framer, Benjamin Franklin.79 The OED, then,
recognizes that progress as meaning advancement or improvement reflects
the meaning that Franklin intended in the quotation, and Franklin’s use of
progress with science suggests that he employed the same meaning as
found in the Copyright Clause.
ii. Constitutional Convention
The history of the Constitutional Convention also informs the meaning
of Progress. Two delegates, Charles Pinckney and James Madison, made

73. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S.
Converse 1828) (unpaginated). The six entries are:
1. A moving or going forward; a proceeding onward.
2. A moving forward in growth; increase; as the progress of a plant or animal.
3. Advance in business of any kind; as the progress of a negotiation; the progress of arts.
4. Advance in knowledge; intellectual or moral improvement; proficiency.
5. Removal; passage from place to place.
6. A journey of state; a circuit.
Id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See Progress, n., OED ONLINE, http:/www.oed.com/view/Entry/152236?rskey=zHHBQF&
result=1eid (last updated June 2007).
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis deleted).
79. See Sean M. O’Connor, The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property
Clause, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 803–05 (2015) (looking to Benjamin Franklin, among others, as a
Framer whose view could have influenced the meaning of the IP Clause).
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proposals relevant to the wording of the Intellectual Property Clause.80
Pinckney proposed the following: “To establish seminaries for the
promotion of literature and the arts & sciences”; “To secure to Authors
exclusive rights for a certain time”; and “To grant patents for useful
inventions.”81 Madison proposed the following: “To secure to literary
authors their copy rights for a limited time”; and “To encourage by
premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and
discoveries.”82
Together these proposals account for all the words (or variations
thereof) comprising eight of the eleven key terms in the Intellectual
Property Clause. Recall that the Intellectual Property Clause sets forth both
the copyright and patent powers of Congress.83 The eleven key terms of the
Intellectual Property Clause consist of the following: promote, Progress,
Science, useful Arts, securing, limited Times, Authors, Inventors, exclusive
Right, Writings, Discoveries.84 Of these, the key terms not mentioned in
their proposals are Writings, Inventors, and Progress.85 Although Writings
and Inventors do not appear in the proposals, their analogues do: authors
and inventions. Authors (found in the proposals) create writings (not found
in the proposals) just as inventors (not found in the proposals) create
inventions (found in the proposals). Thus, two of the three terms not in the
proposals (Writings and Inventors) follow naturally from the meanings of
terms in the proposals (Authors and inventions). The only term not
referenced in the proposals (either by specific mention or by analogue) is
Progress. Yet like Writings and Inventors, Progress does have a
corresponding term in the proposals: advancement. The term advancement
is found in Madison’s proposal, “the advancement of useful knowledge and
discoveries.”86 And as discussed in the section above, advancement was
one of the meanings for progress at the time of the Framing.87 It is
therefore reasonable to conclude that Progress in the Copyright Clause
80. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES
563–64 (Charles Tansill ed. 1927) [hereinafter FORMATION OF THE UNION].
81. Id. at 564.
82. Id. at 563.
83. The Intellectual Property Clause states that Congress shall have power “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also
discussion supra Part II (explaining that the Copyright Clause derives from the Intellectual Property
Clause).
84. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. I do not consider the word respective to be a key
substantive term because it merely provides structure to the substantive key terms within the Intellectual
Property Clause.
85. See FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 80, at 563–64.
86. Id. at 563.
87. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a.
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means advancement in view of the following three facts: first, advancement
was a meaning for progress at the time; second, the term advancement
appears in one of Madison’s proposals where progress could have
otherwise appeared; and third, every other key term in the Intellectual
Property Clause is found in those proposals.88
Further evidence that Progress means advancement is apparent from
the structure and meanings of words within one of Madison’s proposals:
specifically, “To encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of
useful knowledge and discoveries.”89 Structurally, Madison’s phrase “the
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries” has the same
grammatical arrangement as the phrase “the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,” with advancement corresponding to the placement of Progress in
that arrangement. Also with regard to structure, Madison’s proposal sets
forth a means (“by premiums and provisions”) to accomplish an end (“the
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries”). This is the only
proposal of either Madison or Pinckney that employs a means–ends
structure, similar to the ends–means structure of the Intellectual Property
Clause.90 Within the ends portion of Madison’s proposal (“the advancement
of useful knowledge and discoveries”) and the ends portion of the
Intellectual Property Clause (“To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts”) are corresponding word meanings: useful knowledge in
Madison’s proposal corresponds to the meaning of Science, and discoveries
in Madison’s proposal corresponds to useful Arts, the focus of patent.91
These corresponding meanings appear in the same order in the ends
portions of both Madison’s proposal and the Intellectual Property Clause.
So because advancement in Madison’s proposal appears in the same order
as Progress in the Clause, advancement appears to have the same meaning
as Progress as well—just like the corresponding order and meanings of the
other words in the ends portions of Madison’s proposal and the Intellectual
Property Clause. Thus, the history of the Constitutional Convention
suggests that Progress means advancement.

88. Ironically, then, Madison appears to have elucidated the meaning of Progress in
Copyright Clause by failing to include the word in his proposal.
89. See FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 80, at 563.
90. The ends portion of the Copyright Clause is found in the initial phrase, “To promote
Progress of Science and useful Arts”; the means for accomplishing those ends are found in
remainder of the Copyright Clause “by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
91. See Snow, supra note 38, at 306; Oliar, supra note 30, at 1798, 1809.
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iii. Writings of Madison
Writings of James Madison should be considered in examining the
meaning of Progress because Madison was the only member of the
constitutional committee that drafted the verbiage of the Copyright Clause
who also proposed the copyright power.92 Given this fact, it is not
unreasonable to conclude that Madison likely had the greatest influence on
the wording of the Clause.
In a letter to Archibald Stuart, a fellow politician from Virginia,
Madison referred to progress as it relates to a particular science: “The
diversity of opinions on so interesting a subject, among men of equal
integrity & discernment, is at once a melancholy proof of the fallibility of
the human judgment, and of the imperfect progress yet made in the science
of Government.”93 This use is particularly noteworthy because Madison
employed progress in the context of describing a science, similar to the
Copyright Clause’s employment of Progress to describe Science.
Specifically, Madison explained that diverse opinions lead to imperfect
progress in the science of government. The progress that one would
associate with the science of government seems more likely to suggest
improvements or advancements in government (advancement interpretation
of Progress) than the spread of government (spread interpretation of
Progress). Indeed, it seems clear that Madison employed progress here to
suggest a qualitative improvement or advancement—not a spread.
Other writings of Madison suggest the same meaning of progress. In
another letter to Archibald Stuart, Madison referred to the progress of the
new constitutional government as follows: “It is impossible indeed to trace
the progress and tendency of this fond experiment without perceiving
difficulty and danger in every Stage of it.”94 To Thomas Jefferson, Madison
wrote about the confederation as a feudality of republics, each with its own
constitution, and asked about the progress of that system: “And what has
been the progress and event of the feudal Constitutions? In all of them a
continual struggle between the head and the inferior members . . . .”95
Although neither of these uses of progress directly refers to Science or
knowledge, they refer to democratic government, which, in Madison’s
92. See Snow, supra note 38, at 289–90 (detailing history of Madison at the Constitutional
Convention and his involvement in passing the Virginia copyright statute).
93. Letter from James Madison to Archibald Stuart (Oct. 30, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 135, 135 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1988)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
94. Letter from James Madison to Archibald Stuart (Dec. 14, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 93, at 237, 238 (emphasis added).
95. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 93, at 97, 101 (emphasis added).
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view, likely reflected a product of the knowledge that arose through the
Enlightenment.96 And both these examples show his use of progress to
suggest a qualitative improvement.
Thus, the meaning of Progress in the Progress of Science of the
Copyright Clause suggests a qualitative improvement or advancement in
science. This means that the assumption is reasonable that the copyright
power provides Congress a power to promote a qualitative end. And that
assumption supports my argument that Congress has a power to direct
authors to content that is likely to promote a qualitative end. In short, the
power to promote the qualitative end of progress in science suggests power
to designate content that will best effectuate such an end.
3. Science as Restricting Progress
Although the meaning of Progress appears to provide Congress
discretion to make qualitative decisions about copyrightable content, the
meaning of Science appears to restrain that discretion. Progress is relative
to the meaning Science.97 The Progress Clause restricts the expansive
meaning of progress to a specific subject matter—science.98 This means,
then, that Congress may not employ the copyright power for the purpose of
promoting progress in some other subject, such as commerce. Congress
may promote only that progress which specifically pertains to science. The
term Science in the Progress Clause restricts Congress’s discriminatory
power of promoting progress.
Of course, in grammar and perhaps in theory the term Science may be
restrictive of the term Progress in the Progress Clause, but what does this
mean as a practical matter? How does Science actually restrict Congress’s
power to discriminate in deciding copyrightable content? The answer is
twofold: first, Science precludes Congress from exercising viewpoint
discrimination in defining copyright; and second, Science precludes
Congress from granting copyright to certain categories of content. These
conclusions follow from the meaning of Science, which I discuss below.
Courts and scholars recognize the meaning of Science as knowledge or
learning.99 That knowledge or learning, however, does not denote cognitive
96. See generally I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 267–68 (1995)
(explaining Madison’s view of science as a product of the Enlightenment).
97. See 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6 (observing that Progress must refer to something that may
be advanced or encouraged).
98. Indeed, Congress’s power to promote progress is not unrestricted, in contrast to Congress’s
power to promote general welfare. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, with id. cl. 1.
99. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (“The ‘Progress of Science,’
petitioners acknowledge, refers broadly to ‘the creation and spread of knowledge and learning.’”);
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (explaining the public benefit of copyright as “the
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awareness of anything.100 As I have written in another article, Science in
the Progress Clause means knowledge and learning that arises through the
process of reason and experience, ultimately leading to truth.101 The
advancements of science follow from trial and error, as well as from reason
and logic.102 And progress in science necessarily follows from, and only
from, the method of science. This is important because it means that
Congress’s attempts to promote progress in science must accord with this
general process of gaining knowledge through reason and experience. More
specifically, it means that Congress cannot dictate which particular views
represent truth or effect worthwhile outcomes.103 Congress could not, for
instance, grant copyright only to views that promote the Republican party.
This would not accord with the method of science. Science would require a
diversity of viewpoints, with a time for testing, so that the best viewpoint
could prevail. Competition among viewpoints, with trial and error, reflects
the method of science.104 As a result, Science precludes Congress from
using its copyright power to favor particular viewpoints. So while the term
Progress enables Congress to choose which subject-matter categories to
promote, the term Science restricts Congress from passing judgment on
specific ideas or views.
The meaning of Science also may restrict Congress from granting
copyright to some specific categories of content. Just as when Congress
exercises any other congressional power,105 Congress’s judgment about
whether a category of content will promote progress in science must be

proliferation of knowledge” which would “ensure[] the progress of science”); id. at 243 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (explaining undisputed premise that by “‘Science’ . . . the Framers meant learning or
knowledge”); 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 123 (1994) (“The term ‘science’
as used in the Constitution refers to the eighteenth-century concept of learning and knowledge.”); L.
RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS
48 (1991) (“[T]he word science retains its eighteenth-century meaning of ‘knowledge or learning.’”);
O’Connor, supra note 79, at 778–79, 784 (“Thus, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the basic
ideas of ‘art’ and ‘science’ were entrenched. ‘Science’ meant the ‘systematic study’ of anything. ‘Art’
meant the manipulation of changeable aspects of the world.”); Snow, supra note 38, at 265 (listing
courts and commentators interpreting the constitutional purpose of copyright as mandating an increase
in knowledge).
100. See Snow, supra note 38, at 317.
101. See id.
102. See 1 JOHNSON, supra note 65 (unpaginated) (defining science as “Certainty grounded on
demonstration”); Snow, supra note 38, at 277–78 (describing reason and experience as part of the
process of science at the Framing).
103. The Free Speech Clause also restricts Congress from extending copyright to specific
viewpoints. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”); Snow, supra note 3, at 1517–18.
104. For a discussion on how content-based copyright denial furthers the marketplace of ideas
theory of free speech, see Snow, supra note 3, at 1504–09.
105. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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reasonable.106 That is, Congress’s judgment about granting copyright to a
category of content must bear a rational relationship to the improvement of
knowledge and learning.107 Under this rational-basis standard for judging
Congress’s discretionary acts, the question arises whether it would be
unreasonable to grant copyright for particular categories of content. That is:
are some categories of content so contrary to the progress of science that it
would be unreasonable for Congress to grant them a copyright? Perhaps.108

106. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–22 (2003) (rejecting higher level of
scrutiny in examining changes to Copyright Act).
107. Cf. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (seemingly applying a rational-basis review
of amendment to Copyright Act).
108. The expansive subject matter of knowledge or learning, as well as the subjective standards
necessary to determine improvement and advancement, arguably suggests that courts might not be able
to apply any meaningful criteria to determine whether Congress’s choice is unreasonable. The scope of
knowledge and learning seems unbounded, and the standard of improvement and advancement seems to
depend on subjective opinion. All content enables audiences to learn something—even if only the
existence of the content itself—and all content turns on subjective opinion as to whether it effects
advancements and improvements in knowledge. Therefore, Progress of Science could be construed as
allowing Congress to grant or deny copyright to any content on the grounds that—in Congress’s view—
the content does or does not advance the general store of knowledge. Thus, at first glance, the
Copyright Clause does not seem to provide any meaningful standard against which to determine
whether Congress has acted reasonably in granting or denying copyright.
This conclusion begs history and precedent. As I have written elsewhere, history well establishes
content-based boundaries to the Copyright Clause. See Snow, supra note 30, at 6–33. In 1790, the first
Copyright Act was content neutral, extending protection to “map[s], chart[s], . . . or books.” See
Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (amended 1831). Yet the public sought copyright protection
mostly for scholastic and instructional works. See Snow, supra note 38, at 300–03. Fictional works
were noticeably underrepresented, suggesting a public understanding that the scope of the Copyright
Clause was fairly narrow in content. Id. Similarly, in 1829 a Supreme Court Justice, sitting by
designation in the Southern District of New York, opined that Congress’s copyright authority extended
only to content that exhibited a “fixed, permanent and durable character,” and on that basis, denied
copyright protection for a daily publication on the stock market. See Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999,
1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1829) (Thompson, J.). The Supreme Court later recited this limited scope of the
Copyright Clause in the 1879 case of Baker v. Selden. See 101 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1879). Early copyright
history thus indicates that much content would not have reasonably fallen within the meaning of
promoting the progress of science.
As cultural values changed over time, the scope of copyrightable content expanded. Snow, supra note
30, at 10–33. The categories of content that could reasonably be construed as promoting progress in
science expanded with shifts in cultural understandings of value in content. Id. Continuing to extend
protection to the full extent of the Copyright Clause, Congress extended copyright protection to all
content categories that could reasonably be construed as promoting progress in science. Id. Courts, in
turn, recognized copyright protection in entertainment, advertisements, and personal letters, which
content would not have been copyrightable under earlier applications of the Copyright Clause. See id.
What could reasonably be thought to improve or advance knowledge and learning dramatically
increased over time. See id.
Despite this increase in coverage, for most of the twentieth century courts refrained from recognizing
that the Copyright Clause extended to pornographic works. See id. Congress’s silence on whether
protection extended to such works indicated that courts, in denying copyright to pornography, viewed
such content as falling outside the scope of content that could reasonably be construed as promoting
progress in science. See id. As one court stated,
[C]ongress is not empowered by the constitution to pass laws for the protection or benefit of
authors and inventors, except as a means of promoting the progress of ‘science and useful
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Some categories of content may be so contrary to cultural understandings
of promoting progress that they cannot reasonably fall within the scope of
copyrightable works. An example might be unprotected speech, such as
libel.109 Similarly, protected speech that the culture generally recognizes as
lacking value might lie outside the boundaries of copyrightable subject
matter, such as hate speech,110 pornography,111 or crime-facilitating
speech.112 Although I do not argue the merits of such specific examples
here, I do observe the possibility that Science might restrict Congress from
extending copyright to some categories of content.113 And more practically
speaking, the terms Progress and Science provide Congress ample
authority to deny copyright for these examples of content. Such content
could reasonably be construed as failing to promote improvements in
knowledge and learning.
In sum, Progress of Science indicates that Congress may decide which
general category of content may be copyrighted, and the public decides the
success or demise of the viewpoints within that content.
B. History of Congress
This section examines the history of Congress practicing content
discrimination in extending copyright. This history is relevant because, if
existent, it would serve as evidence that the Constitution gives Congress
arts.’ . . . [A] dramatic composition which is grossly indecent, and calculated to corrupt the
morals of the people . . . neither ‘promotes the progress of science or useful arts,’ but the
contrary.
Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (No. 9173) (C.C.D. Cal. 1867). Some content, including
pornographic and libelous works, would be unreasonable to construe as promoting progress in science.
See id. This view was challenged, however, in 1979. In Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult
Theater, the Fifth Circuit held that pornography, and specifically legal obscenity, was reasonable to
construe as promoting progress in science. 604 F.2d 852, 854–60 (5th Cir. 1979). The Mitchell court did
not, however, declare that Congress could copyright any and all content, or alternatively, declare that
Congress must copyright all content. See id. Rather, the court asked whether it was reasonable for
Congress to grant copyright to legal obscenity. Id. at 860 (“We cannot say this judgment was so
unreasonable as to exceed congressional power.”). Thus, history teaches that Congress’s decision to
copyright content is subject to an inquiry as to whether content could reasonably promote the progress
of science. And that inquiry is subject to changing cultural values.
109. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (opining that some
expression has “such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it]
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”).
110. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 8, at 45.
111. See infra notes 215, 216 and accompanying text.
112. See Volokh, supra note 8, at 1217.
113. See Snow, supra note 30, at 56–61 (“Simply put, the [Progress] Clause limits Congress in
extending copyright to that which promotes Progress, but no more than that.”) (contemplating narrow
and obvious limits of copyright protection, and citing hate speech, extremely violent video games,
gambling software, and pornography as possible examples of content falling outside the scope of the
Progress Clause).
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the power to perform that action.114 With regard to the history of Congress
extending copyright based on content, from one perspective Congress has
done so for several decades.115 Since its enactment in 1976, the present
Copyright Act has barred copyright for ideas, and as an extension of ideas,
facts also have not received copyright.116 Congress has also denied
copyright for expression that is not original, lacking sufficient creativity.117
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, these exceptions of idea, fact, and
originality existed as matters of constitutional and common law, dating
back into the nineteenth century.118 Importantly, these exceptions to
copyright require an examination of content to determine whether
expression contains ideas, facts, and originality.119 They require courts to
examine what an author is saying. It might seem, then, that this lengthy
history of determining copyright eligibility based on content suggests that
Congress may continue to do so using other criteria that examine content—
pornography120 and violent video games, for instance.121
114. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) (reciting long history of Congress
granting authors term extensions on existing works as evidence of constitutionality of act).
115. See Baker, supra note 45, at 922 (“[C]opyright laws involve content-based suppression of
speech in the simplest and most direct sense.”); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 186 (1998) (“Copyright liability
turns on the content of what is published.”).
116. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, § 102(b), 90 Stat. 2541, 2545 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012)); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)
(indicating that copyright’s restriction against copyrighting ideas also restricts copyrighting facts).
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 102; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–50
(1991). Perhaps more subtly, Congress appears to have exercised content discrimination in extending
copyright protection through the fair-use doctrine. Fair use calls for greater copyright protection for
works that are more creative in nature. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012). Specifically, the second factor in
the fair-use doctrine considers whether the original work is creative, or alternatively, factual in nature.
Id. (examining “the nature of the copyrighted work”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563–64 (explaining
that the second fair-use factor distinguishes between “factual works” and “works of fiction or fantasy”);
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir. 2003) (relying on
Harper & Row’s interpretation of the second fair-use factor to draw a distinction between creative
works and factual works).
118. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884) (explaining
originality doctrine as constitutional requirement); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1879)
(exempting process idea from copyright protection).
119. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1, 50 (2001) (recognizing that “on a broad, macro level copyright law might be seen to
discriminate out of concern for communicative impact” because it favors original over nonoriginal
expression).
120. See Bartow, supra note 9, at 19–25 (arguing that because much of copyright law determines
rights based on content, Congress barring protection for pornography would be consistent with existent
content-based discriminators in copyright).
121. Consistent with the interpretation of Science in Part II.A.3 above, the sort of content
discrimination that Congress has exercised through these discriminators has not included viewpoint
discrimination. Congress’s past practice of content discrimination suggests the power to target only
general categories of content—not viewpoints. The discriminators of idea, fact, and originality are
themselves so abstract from the actual content that they do not approach the specific ideas contained
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It might be argued that although these discriminators of idea, fact, and
originality call for an examination of content, they are not altogether
persuasive to conclude that Congress’s existent practice of content
discrimination suggests its power to target other categories of content. The
Supreme Court has held that the Copyright Clause itself mandates the idea,
fact, and originality doctrines.122 Hence, the presence of these
discriminators in the Copyright Act represents a codification of
constitutional requirements—not a choice by Congress. It is unclear, then,
that these content-based discriminators establish a history of Congress (as
distinct from the Constitution) choosing content-based categories to
promote.
Congress has, however, exercised content discrimination in defining
copyright eligibility without a constitutional obligation to do so. For
decades, Congress has denied copyright to expression that functions as a
useful article, where aesthetic design cannot be distinguished from
utilitarian function.123 Mannequins, for instance, are non-copyrightable
useful articles because their expressive elements cannot be distinguished
from their utilitarian function.124 The useful-article doctrine could be
construed as a statutory denial of copyright for content that serves a useful
purpose.
Similarly, Congress has adjusted the rights of copyright holders based
on categories of content. Specifically, Congress has designated that
nondramatic musical works are subject to a compulsory licensing
scheme,125 that sound recordings lack a right of public performance,126 that
certain visual arts have moral rights,127 and that photographs of buildings
that are visible to the public do not violate the copyright in the building’s

within the content. Cf. Netanel, supra note 119, at 50 (viewing copyright’s “broad-brush concern with
communicative impact” as analogous to a structural regularity designed to promote expressive diversity
and widespread availability). Because the fact, idea, and originality discriminators are sufficiently
abstract from the content—encompassing content that is so wide-ranging—Congress is not targeting
specific viewpoints through these discriminators. That said, Professor Tushnet aptly observes that
copyright does cause systematic effects on content and viewpoint. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a
Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign
Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 49 (2000).
122. See Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 349–51. With respect to content examination in fair use, see
supra note 117, the Supreme Court has observed that fair use represents a doctrine with “speechprotective purposes and safeguards,” thereby ostensibly required by the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–19 (2003).
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
124. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985); cf. KieselsteinCord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that design of belt
buckle to be copyrightable on grounds that the design is conceptually separable from functionality).
125. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
126. See id. § 106.
127. See id. § 106A.
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architecture.128 Arguably these criteria indicate a pattern of content
discrimination by Congress.
Yet these criteria are not entirely persuasive that Congress has a history
of exercising content discrimination. To begin with, the useful-article
doctrine may be distinguished from the sort of discriminators that this
Article contemplates. The useful-article doctrine exists to prevent copyright
from interfering with the domain of patent—not to discourage the
production of useful articles.129 Arguably, the useful-article doctrine is
permissible as a division between copyright and patent, as distinct from a
discriminator that discourages the production of certain content.
As for the other content-based criteria mentioned, they, too, seem weak
evidence of Congress having exercised the sort of content discrimination
that this Article contemplates. The discriminators mentioned—nondramatic
musical works, sound recordings, visual arts, photographs of buildings—
seem to discriminate based more on form than on subject-matter content.
Congress has designated forms of copyrightable content since the original
1790 Copyright Act, which specified protection only for “map[s],
chart[s] . . . or books.”130 Similarly, the 1909 Act designated the following
categories for which protection existed:
(a) Books, including composite and cyclopædic works, directories,
gazetteers, and other compilations;
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers;
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, prepared for oral delivery;
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions;
(e) Musical compositions;
(f) Maps;
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art;
(h) Reproductions of a work of art;
(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(j) Photographs;
(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations.131
Likewise, the current 1976 Copyright Act lists similar categories of
protection.132 So on the one hand, such categories do call for an

128. See id. § 120.
129. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
130. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (amended 1831).
131. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076–77 (repealed
1976).
132. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (extending copyright protection to “(1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
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examination of content: a court must examine expression to judge whether
it does in fact constitute a designated category. On the other hand, the
categories may be viewed as representing mere forms of expression. For
instance, an author’s sentiments might be expressed through a book, a
musical composition, a sermon, a photograph, or a work of art. The
designated categories might indicate different formats to engage in
expression. Viewed in this light, the categories do not seem to target
subject matter as much as they seem to recognize means through which an
author expresses content. They seem to focus more on how a work is
expressed more than they focus on what is being expressed. They thus
seem weak support of historical evidence where Congress has exercised
content discrimination.
The sort of content discrimination that this Article contemplates is rare,
where Congress has excluded specific content from copyright protection
either in an attempt to decrease content production or in recognition that
content simply fails to promote progress. But instances do seem to exist. In
1856, when Congress introduced the right to perform dramatic
compositions, Congress described the right as applying to works “suited for
public representation.”133 Arguably, the word “suited” suggests that
dramatic compositions must comprise suitable content to be
copyrightable.134 This interpretation, of course, is weak. Congress provided
no guidance as to the meaning of suited, and moreover, the word appears
only in a passing description of dramatic compositions.135
In 1874, Congress specified that engravings, cuts, and prints were
copyrightable only if they were “pictorial illustrations or works connected
with the fine arts.”136 In the same sentence, Congress continued: “no prints
or labels designed to be used for any other article of manufacture shall be
entered under the copyright law.”137 Hence, in two instances of the 1874
Act Congress referred to types of content ineligible for copyright.
Nevertheless, Congress removed the discriminatory language in passing the
1909 Copyright Act.138

pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works”).
133. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (repealed 1870).
134. See Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922–23 (No. 9173) (C.C.D. Cal. 1867).
135. Nevertheless, one court construed that word to suggest that Congress intended that dramatic
compositions be eligible for copyright only if they adhered to a moral standard. See id.
136. Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, 18 Stat. pt. 3 78, 79 (repealed 1909).
137. Id.
138. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
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To sum up, in exercising its copyright power, Congress has a history of
employing content discriminators.139 And this fact may serve as evidence
that the Copyright Clause enables Congress to target specific content. But
the support is lacking in some respects. The idea, fact, and originality
content discriminators are (according to the Court) required by the
Copyright Clause; the useful-article discriminator allocates property rights
between copyright and patent law; other categories of content that
Congress has designated seem to target form rather than content. The only
instances where Congress seems to have targeted content consist of two
mere blips during the nineteenth century. Thus, support for content-based
content discrimination draws mixed support from Congress’s history.140
139. Congress’s power to define copyright eligibility draws indirect support from its history of
content discrimination in the areas of patent law. Congress’s patent power arises in the same
constitutional clause as its copyright power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). That patent power
enables Congress to incentivize expression that discloses inventions. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012)
(requiring a written description of invention to receive a patent). Under that power, Congress has
legislated to discourage the expression of certain content by denying patent protection for inventions
directed toward human organisms, see Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199,
§ 634, 118 Stat. 3, 101, and for inventions relating to nuclear energy or atomic bombs, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2181(a) (2012) (originally enacted as Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 11, 60 Stat. 755, 768–
70). More recently, Congress has denied patent protection for “any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or
deferring tax liability.” 35 U.S.C. § 102 note (2012) (Tax Strategies Deemed Within the Prior Art).
Admittedly, the focus of Congress’s patent power is distinct from its copyright power. See Graham v.
John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (recognizing that the focus of patent law is “useful
Arts” in the Intellectual Property Clause). Patent exists to encourage new, useful, and nonobvious
inventions, see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, content discrimination in patent law does not necessitate the
conclusion that content discrimination in copyright is permissible. Yet patent law is relevant to a certain
extent because it demonstrates Congress discouraging certain categories of content by denying a
subsidy under the Intellectual Property Clause. Hence, denying rights to discourage content does not
reflect an unprecedented use of Congress’s intellectual property power.
140. At least one federal circuit has interpreted Congress’s silence on copyrightable content as a
choice that all content should be copyrighted. See Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater,
604 F.2d 852, 854–58 (5th Cir. 1979). The Mitchell court viewed Congress as refraining from
exercising its existent power to discriminate based on content. Id.; see also Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666
F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1982) (agreeing with the Mitchell court’s reasoning that Congress’s silence
suggests a choice not to exercise its content-discriminatory power).
Relevant to the history of Congress exercising content discrimination are any congressional actions
directed toward patent, which arise under the Copyright Clause. If Congress has practiced content
discrimination in defining patent eligibility, this fact might suggest that Congress may also do so in
defining copyright eligibility. It is debatable, however, whether content discrimination in patent would
raise the same speech issues as copyright, given that the subject matter of patent is directed to objects or
processes rather than speech. Putting aside that issue, patent history does not indicate a lengthy practice
of discrimination that is not abstract (unlike the requirements for utility, novelty, non-obviousness) or
that is for the purpose of discouraging the production of particular works. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Congress has only recently introduced a content-based criterion in patent law—a preclusion for patents
directed to human organisms. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634,
118 Stat. 3, 101. Since 1946, however, Congress has precluded the patentability of inventions relating
to nuclear energy or atomic bombs—an ostensible content-based restriction. See 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a)
(2012) (originally enacted as Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 11, 60 Stat. 755, 768–70). But that
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C. Supreme Court Statements
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of
whether the Copyright Clause allows Congress to discriminate in extending
copyright for the purpose of discouraging certain content. It has, however,
made statements that may shed light on this issue, both in the older case of
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.141 and the more modern cases of
Eldred v. Ashcroft142 and Golan v. Holder.143 This section examines those
cases.
1. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.
Perhaps the most influential opinion on the subject of content
discrimination in copyright is the Supreme Court’s decision in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.144 Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., set forth a nondiscrimination principle that precluded
a determination of copyright eligibility based on a work’s content.145 The
issue under consideration was simple: whether the apparent lack of artistic
value in circus posters precluded their eligibility for copyright protection.146
Holding that they were eligible for copyright, Holmes preached against
content discrimination.147 He applied this principle to the governing
Copyright Act, which specified that engravings, cuts, or prints were
copyrightable only if they constituted “pictorial illustrations or works
connected with the fine arts.”148 That same Act denied copyright for “prints
or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture.”149
Holmes read fine arts to mean anything that Congress had not specifically
exempted, i.e., “prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of
manufacture.”150 If fine arts were construed to mean anything else, Holmes
action seems necessary to carry out its power to “provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18. Hence, the common-defense power appears
to justify the content-based restriction that Congress imposed in exercising its patent power under the
Copyright Clause. Congress’s history of discriminatory action in patent thereby provides only weak
evidence in support of the argument for a power to discriminate in exercising its copyright power under
the Copyright Clause.
141. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
142. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
143. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
144. 188 U.S. 239.
145. Id. at 251–52.
146. Id. at 248.
147. See id. at 251–52.
148. Id. at 250 (quoting Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, 18 Stat. pt. 3 78, 79 (repealed 1909)).
149. Id. at 251 (quoting Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, 18 Stat. pt. 3 78, 79 (repealed 1909)).
150. Id. (quoting Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, 18 Stat. pt. 3 78, 79 (repealed 1909)).
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taught, then great works would surely go unappreciated.151 Content
discrimination was an evil to be avoided at all costs.152
Some commentators may read the nondiscrimination principle in
Bleistein as suggesting that Congress lacks authority to discriminate under
the Copyright Clause. But this would be incorrect. Holmes directed his
warning to judges—not Congress.153 He specifically directed his most
famous articulation of the nondiscrimination principle to the Judiciary: “It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”154 Persons trained only
to the law are judges—not members of Congress, who come from all walks
of life. Holmes further specified to whom he was directing this admonition
in his subsequent sentences: “At the one extreme, some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. . . . At the other end, copyright would
be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the
judge.”155 The judge, then, is the actor against whom Holmes warned of
failing to appreciate works of genius or overlooking the public’s
preference. It is the Judiciary for which Holmes’s warning is meant—not
Congress.
Holmes’s language also makes clear that Congress may discriminate.
In articulating the principle that originality is found in every expression,
Holmes stated: “[Personality] expresses its singularity even in handwriting,
and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one
man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction
in the words of the act.”156 According to Holmes, then, Congress may
restrict expression that is eligible for copyright. Tellingly, in articulating
this principle of restriction, Holmes was careful to specify that the
restriction must come from “the words of the act,” which can only be
interpreted as a choice by Congress—not by judges.157 Congress is the only
institution that Holmes recognized as having authority to restrict the scope
of copyright.
Of course this language does not indicate whether such congressional
discrimination may be based on content or not. But other language in the
Bleistein opinion does. Holmes recognized a content-based restriction when
he endorsed the validity of Congress’s choice to deny copyright for “prints
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 251–52.
See id.
See id. at 251–52.
Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
Id. at 251–52 (emphasis added).
Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
See id.
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or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture.”158 The
restriction targets specific content, and Holmes adhered to that
congressional choice.159 So just as Holmes is known for deferring to
Congress in other matters, copyright is no different.160 Congress may
discriminate on content; judges may not—so taught Holmes in Bleistein.
Given that Holmes respected Congress’s discretion not to copyright
certain content, the question arises: Why didn’t Holmes adhere to
Congress’s choice to deny copyright for pictorial works that were not
connected with the fine arts? If Holmes adhered to congressional
discrimination over content relating to articles of manufacture, why not
over content relating to the fine arts? The answer is simple. It’s much easier
to identify prints that are designed for an article of manufacture than prints
that are fine art. In Holmes’s view, fine art is simply art that its beholder
prefers, so the fine arts restriction would introduce unfettered judicial
discretion into questions of copyright eligibility.161 There would not be any
intelligible principle for judges to objectively apply in determining which
prints were copyrightable.162 At bottom, then, Holmes appeared concerned
with an unconstitutional delegation of power from Congress to the courts.
Congress has authority to exercise its qualitative judgment to determine
that which promotes progress. But the Judiciary does not. Hence, Holmes’s
concern echoes the modern nondelegation doctrine, which the Supreme
Court eventually articulated after Bleistein while Holmes was still on the
Court.163 In Bleistein, Holmes simply foretold the evil of Congress failing
158. See id. at 251.
159. See id.
160. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[The
Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States.”); Otis & Gassman v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (opining that only a “clear, unmistakable
infringement of rights secured by the fundamental law” would justify a court interfering with legislative
law) (quoting Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 429 (1902)); JEREMY COHEN, CONGRESS SHALL MAKE
NO LAW: OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 70
(1989) (explaining that Holmes believed the court justified in interfering with a legislative law only if
that law constituted an explicit violation of the Constitution); DORSEY RICHARDSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 20–22 (1924) (observing Holmes’s restrictive view
of the Court in reviewing legislative law).
161. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251–52.
162. Cf. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (articulating intelligible-principle
requirement in nondelegation doctrine, stating that “Congress does not violate the Constitution merely
because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors.
So long as Congress ‘lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.’” (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).
163. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also Touby, 500
U.S. at 164–65 (“Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of
Government.”).
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to offer the Judiciary any intelligible principle in applying the power of
content discrimination.
Bleistein should, therefore, not be read to preclude Congress from
engaging in content discrimination. If anything, Bleistein tacitly calls for
Congress to be specific in exercising content discrimination—as specific as
“prints or labels designed to be used for articles of manufacture” rather
than the more general “fine arts.” Or for that matter, “graphically violent
video games” rather than “offensive entertainment.” So noted.
2. Eldred v. Ashcroft and Golan v. Holder
The modern Supreme Court has made statements that might be
interpreted as either allowing or precluding Congress from exercising
content discrimination in defining copyright. These statements have arisen
in the cases of Eldred v. Ashcroft164 and Golan v. Holder.165
a. Support for Content Discrimination
Under one interpretation, these modern Supreme Court decisions
would be consistent with construing the Copyright Clause as providing
Congress the power to exercise content discrimination. In both Eldred and
Golan, the Court made clear that Congress may do what it pleases in
crafting copyright policy.166 In Eldred, the Court considered the Copyright
Term Extension Act (CTEA), where Congress extended the term of
copyright an additional twenty years and applied that extension to works
that had already been created under the previous term.167 In Golan, the
Court considered the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), where
Congress had re-copyrighted works that had already entered the public
domain.168 In both cases, the Court held that Congress had acted within the
scope of the Copyright Clause.169
These cases exemplify the extent to which the Court defers to
congressional judgment in setting copyright policy. Both in extending the
term of existing works (Eldred) and in taking works out of the public
domain (Golan), Congress had retroactively extended copyright, suggesting

164. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
165. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
166. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (“[T]he [Copyright] Clause ‘empowers Congress to determine
the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the
Clause.’”) (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222)).
167. 537 U.S. at 192–93.
168. 132 S. Ct. at 878–79.
169. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194.
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the practical possibility of a perpetual copyright.170 Such an outcome seems
contrary to the Copyright Clause’s restraint that copyrights must exist only
for “limited Times.”171 Nevertheless, the Court deferred to Congress’s
judgment, holding the acts to be rationally related to promoting the
Progress of Science.172 The Eldred Court explained:
[W]e turn now to whether it is a rational exercise of the legislative
authority conferred by the Copyright Clause. On that point, we
defer substantially to Congress. . . . [W]e are not at liberty to
second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments
of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may
be. . . . [I]t is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how
best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives. . . . [T]he
Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual
property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve
the ends of the Clause.173
Thus, Eldred made clear that the Court greatly defers to Congress’s
judgment as it pursues copyright policies.174
Adding to this argument is the Golan Court’s explanation that
promoting the Progress of Science does not necessarily entail incentivizing
new works.175 Purposes other than incentivizing new works promote
progress, taught the Court.176 The purpose under consideration was
Congress’s attempt to conform to an international agreement, which
necessitated re-copyrighting works in the public domain.177 According to
the Golan Court, that purpose promoted progress because a wellfunctioning international copyright system might induce greater investment
in creativity in the United States.178 The purpose thereby indirectly
promoted progress. Hence, the Golan Court recognized that even indirect
170. See Howard B. Abrams, Eldred, Golan, and Their Aftermath, J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.,
Summer 2013, at 491, 495–98.
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (defining the means of promoting the Progress of Science
as “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings” (emphasis added)); Abrams, supra note 170, at 495–98.
172. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204–05.
173. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204–05, 208, 212, 222; see also Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888–89.
174. See Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2334 (2003)
(describing Eldred as providing deferential review to Congress).
175. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888–89; see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212–13.
176. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889 (“The provision of incentives for the creation of new works is
surely an essential means to advance the spread of knowledge and learning. We hold, however, that it is
not the sole means Congress may use ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science.’”).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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possibilities of progress may support the reasonableness of Congress’s
action under the Copyright Clause.179
These teachings from Eldred and Golan support an interpretation of the
Copyright Clause that allows Congress to exercise content discrimination
in copyright. Such discrimination would represent a policy that, in
Congress’s judgment, best effectuates the aim of promoting progress.
Under this principle, Congress would determine which particular content
promotes progress more so than other content. And such discrimination
appears reasonable against the standard of Golan, where potential indirect
effects of a congressional act were deemed sufficient to find the
congressional act a reasonable exercise of promoting progress. Thus, from
the standpoint of congressional deference, Eldred and Golan open the door
for interpreting the Copyright Clause as allowing congressional content
discrimination.
b. Opposition to Content Discrimination
Despite the great deference that the Supreme Court provided Congress
in Eldred and Golan, other aspects of these cases suggest that the Court
might not read the Copyright Clause as allowing for content discrimination.
To begin with, both Eldred and Golan deal with Congress expanding
copyright coverage, whereas content discrimination involves shrinking that
coverage. In theory this should not make a difference: the Court made clear
that it will not second-guess the “delicate balance” that Congress achieves
in drawing lines of copyright.180 But it remains to be seen whether the
Court would be as deferential to Congress where Congress decreases
protection.181
Some reasoning in Eldred also does not support content discrimination.
The Eldred Court reasoned that it would be unfair for the author of
yesterday’s work to receive a different reward than the author of
tomorrow’s work, so a retroactive application of the term extension was
justified.182 Yet this seemingly unfair situation is exactly what my
interpretation would lead to. The author of yesterday’s pornography could
receive life-plus-seventy years of copyright, whereas if Congress removes
protection for that content, the author of tomorrow’s pornography would

179. Id.
180. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205 n.10.
181. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 543 (2004) (observing that “copyright has been a one-way
ratchet, covering more works and granting more rights for a longer time”).
182. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204.
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receive no copyright. Discrimination that discourages content may
therefore lead to the unfair outcome that Eldred rejected.
Another point about Eldred and Golan that stands in contrast to content
discrimination is the Court’s subtle focus on a quantitative, rather than a
qualitative standard, for reviewing congressional actions under the
Copyright Clause.183 As discussed above, an interpretation of the Copyright
Clause that is consistent with content discrimination requires Progress to
mean advancement or improvement in knowledge, which would thereby
enable Congress to make qualitative judgments relating to particular
expression.184 This interpretation is absent in the Court’s explanation of the
Copyright Clause. Specifically, in explaining that the Copyright Clause
allows Congress to legislate for a purpose other than the creation of new
works, the Golan Court cited dissemination as another important purpose
supporting the promotion of progress.185 The Court also read “Progress of
Science” as meaning “the creation and spread of knowledge and
learning.”186 Its emphasis on creation, dissemination, and spread implicitly
suggests that the term Progress denotes only that which results in a
quantitative increase of works. In short, the Court’s quantitative framework
is inconsistent with an interpretation of Progress that would allow for
content discrimination.
The upshot of Eldred and Golan is that in one respect the Court left the
door open for content-based discrimination by Congress, articulating a
lenient standard of deferential review. But the Court’s paradigmatic
understanding of the Copyright Clause might give Congress trouble. The
Court seems prepared to support congressional acts that extend copyright
coverage and aim to increase quantitative output of works. It remains to be
seen whether the Court would read the Copyright Clause as consistent with
decreasing the output of works in support of a qualitative interpretation of
Progress.187

183. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (emphasizing dissemination); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206
(construing CTEA as providing incentive to create and disseminate works).
184. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
185. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206.
186. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (emphasis added); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206.
187. A Fourth Circuit decision might be interpreted as suggesting against content discrimination
in copyright. See Satellite Broad. & Commc’ns Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2001). There,
Congress imposed a “carry one, carry all” rule under the Intellectual Property Clause. Id. at 367. The
rule became relevant when satellite carriers invoked a statutory copyright license for any broadcasts
they carried from any particular stations in a local market. Id. at 343. Specifically, the rule required such
a carrier to broadcast all requesting stations within that market—in addition to the one it had chosen to
carry under the statutory copyright license. Id. The satellite companies argued that the rule was
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 352. The Court disagreed,
holding that the rule was content-neutral and thereby not subject to strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 354–
55. This portion of the court’s ruling suggests, then, that if Congress were to award copyright based on
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III. POLICY
Even if the text of the Copyright Clause and the history of Congress
suggest the constitutionality of content-based copyright denial, policy
considerations are another matter. Simply put, does constitutional policy
favor an interpretation of the Copyright Clause that allows Congress to
engage in content-based copyright denial? This part argues that policy does
support this interpretation. Section A sets forth two reasons: first,
Congress’s collective perspective is more valuable in achieving copyright’s
collective end than is an individual’s perspective; and second, Congress’s
ability to tailor copyright law according to content enables more efficient
monopolies, avoiding wasteful content suppression. Section B considers
arguments against the interpretation: specifically, the untrustworthy nature
of Congress; the difficulties of assessing content; and the effects of industry
capture.
A. Policy Supporting Content Discrimination
1. A Collective Perspective
The purpose of copyright is to benefit the collective society—not
individuals.188 Copyright functions by preventing persons from copying an
author’s work, not because the author has an inherent right to the copyright
monopoly, but rather because the monopoly enables society to achieve a
collective end. In particular, the societal end of copyright is to improve and
advance knowledge and learning.189
Despite this collective end of copyright law, copyright law relies on
decisions of individuals. Individual preferences determine the success or
failure of copyrighted content in the commercial marketplace. Individuals
decide whether to purchase the copyrighted content, and that decision
dictates the success of particular content. This individual-evaluation system
is desirable because individual assessments are inherently trustworthy:
a speaker’s content, the copyright legislation would be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, and thereby
unconstitutional.
188. The premise that copyright exists to further the collective good is fundamental in both
ancient and modern copyright jurisprudence. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 353–57 (1991) (rejecting Lockean sweat-of-the-brow argument as basis for copyright,
and implicitly recognizing that copyright exists as a statutory right for Congress to define within
constitutional bounds); Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 846–47; 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 143–45
(overturning Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201; 4 Burr. 2303, which had recognized common
law basis for copyright, on basis that copyright is subject to the instrumental will of Parliament).
Indeed, the Copyright Clause specifies the purpose of copyright as an instrumentalist reason—
promoting the progress of science. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
189. See discussion supra Part II.A.2–3.
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individual preferences of the public reflect genuine opinion about the
particular content under consideration, as opposed to potential political
agendas of individual government actors.190 Hence, copyright law relies on
individual assessments of content to reach its collective end of promoting
the progress of science.
This reliance on individual assessments can be problematic, however.
Individual assessments do not always account for the utility or harm that
particular content may pose to the collective.191 Even if collectively the
public would prefer an increase in content that promotes the progress of
science, individual preferences do not always reflect that collective goal.
On average, individual consumers more often prefer mindless video games
to thoughtful scholarship; pointless pornography to serious documentary;
or defamatory mud-slinging to principled opinion.192 Individuals often
focus on the immediate and pleasant effects of content rather than its longterm effects on advancing knowledge. Indeed, the commercial marketplace
does not promise that consumers will base their preferences on the goal of
improving knowledge or learning; rather, that marketplace promises only
efficiency in the matching of consumer with content. In short, individual
preferences in the commercial marketplace seem particularly ill fitted as
the means for promoting the collective end of progress in science.
There is thus a gap between the end and means of copyright: the end is
collective; the means are individual. Congress bridges the gap. As a
collective institution for deciding social policy, Congress brings collective
values to content evaluation that individuals lack.193 Congress can account
for social utility and harm across society. This is not to say, however, that
copyright law should rely exclusively on Congress for determining whether
specific views can receive a copyright. To be sure, individuals should still
determine the value of particular copyrighted works.194 Yet Congress
should be able to channel those individual determinations toward certain
categories of content that are more valuable from a collective
perspective.195 So although copyright law relies on individual preferences
to determine particular content’s value, the benefit of a collective
perspective in assessing that value may be realized from Congress defining
copyright eligibility for general categories of content. In short, Congress
190. See Snow, supra note 3, at 1512–13.
191. Copyright employs a commercial incentive structure that relies on individual choice. See
generally Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 14–15 (1995) (“Copyright is about helping copyright owners make money.”).
192. See Snow, supra note 3, at 1511–12.
193. Id. at 1512–13.
194. See discussion supra Part II.A.3 (explaining that the public, rather than Congress, chooses
among competing views of content).
195. See Snow, supra note 3, at 1512–13.
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should determine which content individuals may evaluate in the
commercial marketplace.
Congress is also better positioned than individuals to account for
negative externalities of content. Individual authors and consumers may
fail to account for harms to innocent third parties that follow from
content.196 For instance, commentators argue that some violent video games
may cause aggressive behavior, possibly leading to serious social harms in
extreme cases.197 Similarly, commentators argue that pornography harms
women both generally and specifically (in the production process).198 Yet
these facts would not likely affect the behavior of their authors and
consumers. Authors and consumers of such content presumably do not
consider these effects when deciding which content to create and consume.
As with any market, the financial marketplace for content is not immune
from individual decisionmakers failing to internalize the social costs of
individual decisions. Congress, on the other hand, is better equipped to
recognize and assess those externalities.
Related to the problem of negative externalities is the problem of
imperfect information. Assuming that some content may lead to harmful
effects for the individual consumer, such consumers may lack this
knowledge. Their individual means of acquiring information restrains their
knowledge: some information is known best through collective means,
such as studying multiple persons who have consumed the content.199
Suppose, for instance, that certain pornographic content leads some
consumers to behave in a manner that is destructive to family relationships.
For an individual consumer of pornography, the fact that consuming the
content could damage his family relationships would likely be relevant to
his purchasing decision. Yet that likelihood may be unknown to the
individual consumer. Individual consumers lack resources to gather and
assess data relating to the consequences of pornography consumption.200
Thus, Congress as a collective institution provides a distinct advantage
over individuals for realizing the collective end of copyright—promoting
progress in science. Congress has both a collective perspective and
collective resources to assess content value. By allowing Congress to
determine which content should receive copyright, Congress can exercise
the perspective and implement the resources best able to yield social
advancements in knowledge.
196. See id.
197. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
198. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Objectification, in SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 213, 234–36
(1999); MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 16–18.
199. See Snow, supra note 3, at 1513.
200. See id. at 1514.
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2. An Efficient Suppression of Copying
Defining copyright eligibility according to content makes good sense
because not all content requires the same rights of exclusion to realize the
purpose of copyright. That is, not all content requires the same set or term
of exclusive rights to incentivize its creation and dissemination. For
instance, it is possible that the copyright term for computer programs need
not be as long as the term for full-length feature films.201 Or the term
necessary to incent news stories may be considerably shorter than the term
necessary to incent academic textbooks. In view of this practical reality, if
Congress must set the same term with the same rights for all content,
Congress would be extending the copyright monopoly longer than is
necessary for certain content. A lengthy copyright duration—and for some
content, even the very existence of a copyright—would be wasteful. Thus,
a uniform set of property rights granted to all content suggests that some
copiers of content must remain silent longer than necessary to incentivize
content creation. And the unnecessary suppression of content repetition
slows content dissemination, which hampers the purpose of copyright.
In selecting the copyright term and scope of rights, Congress should
balance the public’s interest in incenting the particular content against the
public’s interest in gaining access to that content. That balance may vary
according to content. Some content that unquestionably promotes progress
may not need any copyright to exist.202 This might include, for instance,
scholarly research or academic papers.203 To the extent that this sort of
content is self-producing, society gains no social benefit for the cost of
imposing an artificial monopoly, so the copyright is wasteful. Such a
content-based copyright denial would support its further dissemination,
thereby promoting progress in science.
Some categories of content might promote progress, but their overlap
with other forms of intellectual property may not require as long a term as
other content categories. The social costs of monopolizing such content
201. See id. at 1514–15.
202. See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 623, 624 (2012) (questioning copyright’s assumption that external incentives are necessary);
Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 513, 515 (2009) (“[T]he desire to create can be excessive, beyond rationality, and free from the
need for economic incentive. . . . [A] copyright law that treats creativity as a product of economic
incentives can miss the mark and harm what it aims to promote.”).
203. See Jessica Litman, The Economics of Open Access Law Publishing, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 779, 782 (2006) (“The role of copyright in the dissemination of scholarly research is in many
ways curious, since neither authors nor the entities that compensate them for their authorship are
motivated by the incentives supplied by the copyright system.”). Denying copyright for such works
would implicate a means of distribution different from the current publication regime. See id. at 782–
83.
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through two distinct intellectual-property regimes might justify adjusting
the term of copyright. This category might include industrial design or
applied art that substantially serves a utilitarian purpose, potentially
qualifying for a patent.204 Similarly, certain content might arise because of
the opportunity to exploit only some of the exclusive rights available in a
copyright. Film and musical content may be an example of this
phenomenon: it may be the case that only the rights of distribution and
public performance incentivize their production and dissemination. If this
is so, Congress might curtail the right of reproduction for these categories
of content: consumers would then be able to create personal copies of films
and music without violating copyright.205 In short, although these examples
may not reflect an accurate assessment of the particular lines that Congress
should draw, the examples illustrate that content-based flexibility in
extending copyright would allow Congress to efficiently structure the
suppressive monopoly of copyright.206
B. Arguments Against Content Discrimination
Practical concerns may be raised that suggest against Congress
exercising content-based discrimination in copyright. First and foremost,
Congress does not seem a trustworthy actor for the purpose of determining
which content furthers social policy. Second, and related to the first point,
giving Congress the power of discrimination over content could further the
influence of large corporate actors in the legislative process. Third, even
assuming pure motives, Congress seems incompetent both to assess
subjective values that copyright should encourage and to identify the
influence of copyright’s monopoly on expressional output. These concerns
are discussed in turn.

204. Cf. Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 738–48 (1983) (arguing for discriminatory
determinations of copyrightable industrial design based on influence of functional considerations in
design process).
205. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012) (imposing compulsory license scheme for “nondramatic musical
works”).
206. Some expression may be difficult to incent without a longer term. Perhaps authors of
private diary entries need assurance that their works will receive copyright protection well beyond their
death. Cf. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing author’s right
to first publication of private works outweighs usual claim of fair use). But see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating
that unpublished nature of work does not bar finding of fair use).
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1. An Untrustworthy Congress
Congress has a history of acting for political gain rather than for the
good of collective society.207 In the face of this history, the benefits of
content-based copyright denial seem nothing more than a distant
possibility. Although Congress might exercise its discretion to benefit the
collective good, practical history suggests that Congress will not. At best,
members of Congress seem to act for their own constituencies; at worst,
they act for their personal interests. Either way, a bare possibility that
Congress could exercise discretion to benefit the entire collective good of
society seems unpersuasive as a reason to allow the discretion in the first
place. Why should we trust Congress with a power of discrimination if, as a
practical matter, Congress would use that power to further the interests of
individuals rather than the collective? Indeed, to justify giving power to an
actor that has a faulty record of performance, there must be an actual
problem worth fixing—a problem that reflects more than mere
inefficiencies and inaccuracies. There must be a problem with content that
is so harmful that even Congress would act in the best interest of the
collective to fix it.
This argument certainly has merit. But it is not as powerful as it may
first seem. As an initial matter, Congress’s power to discriminate through
denying copyright is not a power to act as a gatekeeper for ideas. And this
is because copyright gives Congress only limited influence over content.
Congress can affect only content that requires government-backed rights of
exclusion as a justification for production or dissemination. Those rights
are often not necessary. In an age of digital encryption, the absence of a
government monopoly would not likely be fatal to a category of content.208
Indeed, in some instances, architectural rights of exclusion may represent
more efficient means than government rights of exclusion.209 Denying
copyright for violent video games, for instance, would not affect
gamemakers’ ability to profit from selling apps through iTunes. Moreover,
content that does not rely on a financial incentive would be completely
unaffected by a copyright denial. Where content creators do not seek to
profit, the copyright denial would be irrelevant. Pornography on YouTube,
for instance, would not go away in the absence of copyright. Hence,
content-based copyright denial does not deny authors access to the

207. See generally Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 760 (2012)
(observing public’s perception of Congress as an untrustworthy actor).
208. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 501, 514–15 (1999); Snow, supra note 3, at 1520.
209. See Snow, supra note 3, at 1520.
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financial marketplace (or the marketplace of ideas for that matter)210—it
denies authors only a government monopoly within that marketplace.211
In addition to the limited nature of Congress’s influence over content,
very real problems justify the risk of allowing Congress a power of content
discrimination. Serious social harms follow from certain content. Consider
pornography, violent video games,212 hate speech,213 and crime-facilitating
material.214 Some scholars observe great social harms that follow from
these categories of content. Some have argued that pornography harms the
social institutions of marriage and family;215 harms women both generally
and specifically (in the production process);216 provokes bad norms; and
damages children’s moral development.217 Some have argued that violent
video games increase aggressive tendencies of their consumers.218 Some
have argued that hate speech can cause psychological injury to victims as
well as harm competing constitutional values of equality, privacy, and
human dignity.219 Some have argued that crime-facilitating material can
lead to terrorist harms on many innocent victims.220 If accurate, these
effects of content would be highly destructive for the social infrastructure
of society. Although the scope of this Article prevents me from offering a
meaningful assessment on the likelihood and actuality of these harms, I do
observe others who forcefully argue that socially destructive harms derive
from certain categories of content.221
Admittedly, these harms cannot always be proven as directly caused by
the content at issue; they do not necessarily occur in every instance; or they
are not immediately apparent. As a result, the harms do not justify
altogether banning or otherwise punishing the content: the content still
receives protection under the Free Speech Clause.222 The content, then, may

210. See id. at 1521.
211. Even then, the strength of that monopoly advantage is debatable. See Mark A. Lemley &
Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100
GEO. L.J. 2055, 2104–07 (2012) (explaining how doctrines of substantial similarity, derivative works,
and fair use may reduce monopoly power of copyright).
212. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011); see id. at 2761–71
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
213. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 8, at 45.
214. See Volokh, supra note 8, at 1217.
215. See Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 17–18 (2000).
216. See Nussbaum, supra note 198, at 213; MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 16–17.
217. See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635,
1647–72 (2005).
218. See infra note 258.
219. See Levinson, supra note 8, at 77–78.
220. See Volokh, supra note 8, at 1217.
221. See supra notes 212–217; Snow, supra note 3, at 1522.
222. See Snow, supra note 3, at 1523.
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be compared to a subtle cause of cancer: its harmful effect often cannot be
proven and usually is not immediate, so the law cannot ban it.223
Nevertheless, the destructive harm continues.224 What can be done? The
answer is copyright: copyright represents a limited means for controlling
harmful content where more effective means of control are simply not
permitted because of uncertainty relating to causality and immediacy of
harm.225 Copyright is the compromise.226
2. Industry Capture
It might be argued that Congress practicing content discrimination
would only exacerbate an existent problem of industry capture. Professor
Jessica Litman has convincingly mapped the history of content industries
capturing Congress’s copyright power.227 Calling for Congress to extend
and curtail copyright rights based on the content of particular expression
would only further expand the dominion of wealthy copyright holders.
Commercial industry would extend its hold over public policy.
This argument certainly has strength in its factual assessment of
Congress. I agree that one effect of Congress imposing content-based
discrimination may be to strengthen the hand of commercial industry in
policy-making decisions. And I further agree that this commercial
influence is not healthy in deciding matters of public policy—at least not in
copyright, which exists to promote the progress of science. I disagree,
however, that this is a reason for Congress to refrain from exercising
content-based discretion in forming copyright law. For one thing,
discrimination would likely make the influence of commercial industry
more transparent. If Congress were to adjust copyright protection for
specific categories of content, the reason for that adjustment would become
more evident than if Congress were to make the very same adjustment for
all content. For instance, a retroactive extension of the copyright term by
twenty years for children’s animated characters and movies would raise
questions regarding Congress’s rationale for targeting that particular

223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 1523.
226. It is important to note that I am not arguing that copyright denial will necessarily reduce
content production in every case. The effect of copyright will depend on the content at issue. Denying
copyright for some content—academic papers, for instance—might actually increase content production
and dissemination. My argument is simply that Congress should be able to examine, and act on, the
issue. Congress should be able to ask whether granting or denying copyright for a particular category of
content furthers the progress of science.
227. See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22–32 (2001); Jessica D. Litman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 870–79 (1987).
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expression, much more so than if Congress had extended the term across
the board.228 Hence, even assuming industry capture of copyright, the
influence of particular industries would likely become more apparent with
content-based discrimination than the influence presently is.
Related to facilitating transparency, discrimination would likely limit
the effects of content-industry lobbying on the Copyright Act as a whole.
By exercising discrimination according to content that reflects
commercially driven influences, Congress would—perhaps unintentionally
—preserve remaining content from the effects of those influences. For
instance, suppose again that in response to industry pressure, Congress
retroactively extended the copyright term for children’s animated
characters and movies. Other forms of expression would not be subject to
the imbalance that a content-specific industry had introduced into
copyright. That is to say, the industry-capture effect would at least be
limited to the content of the industry seeking special treatment. On the
assumption, then, that particular industries are presently influencing
Congress’s exercise of the copyright power, content discrimination would
appear to aid in limiting the scope of that influence.
3. Difficulties in Identifying Values and Incentives
Even assuming the purest congressional motives in attempting to
promote progress, it might be argued that Congress simply lacks the
competency to make value-based distinctions among content. It is arguable
that the market better reflects public preferences of content than does the
heavy hand of government. Let the public discourage the production of
pornography by failing to purchase it, rather than the government through
dictating its moral judgment—so the argument goes.229 This argument,
then, is one that paints a paternalistic picture of Congress imposing its
values over the public’s content.
I appreciate these problems relating to the subjectivity of values. They
should not be ignored. Yet they are insufficient to excuse Congress from its
role of determining content that promotes and impedes progress. Congress
represents the institution charged with deciding policy that will promote
progress. Its resources enable value judgments—the same value judgments

228. Cf. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–514) (adding twenty years to term of all works).
229. Cf. Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1979)
(extending copyright to legally obscene material on grounds that “it is inappropriate for a court . . . to
interpose its moral views between an author and his willing audience”).
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that are relevant to social-policy choices in other contexts.230 Congress uses
the people’s money to subsidize value-laden activities and programs.231
Using property rights to subsidize expression should not be any different.232
Indeed, if public preferences were necessary to determine resources that
Congress expended under the Spending Clause, Congress would only be
able to provide cash subsidies to the public rather than fund programs
directly.233 Only with cash subsidies could members of the public
determine which activities best promoted their own general welfare.234 But
this, of course, ignores reality. Congress determines which values to
promote through its use of public funds. Congress, then, should determine
which values to promote through copyright.
Simply put, Congress is charged with, and has the competency for,
implementing social policy. Although varying value systems and uncertain
incentive structures can make the question of content evaluation a difficult
one, that fact does not mean that Congress should never ask the question.
Congress represents the branch of government that is responsible for
identifying circumstances and implementing policy with available
resources. Copyright is one of those resources—even where policy choices
may be difficult.
IV. APPLICATION EXAMPLES
The Copyright Clause should thus be interpreted as enabling Congress
to exercise content discrimination in defining copyright eligibility.
Congress may deny copyright where the criterion for denial is viewpoint
neutral and it may grant copyright to content where that content is
consistent with a cultural understanding of improving or advancing
knowledge.235 This part analyzes two examples of content categories where
Congress might choose to restrict copyright protection: pornography and
violent video games. I touch on whether policy and political attractiveness
suggest that Congress should and could deny copyright for these categories
230. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998) (explaining
necessity of favoring speech in funding decisions for art program); Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (“Congressional selection of particular entities or
persons for entitlement to this sort of largesse is obviously a matter of policy and discretion not open to
judicial review unless in circumstances which here we are not able to find.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
231. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (placing abortion restrictions on
funding of family-planning programs).
232. See Snow, supra note 3, at 1490–96 (comparing rationale of restrictions of funding with
restrictions of extending copyright).
233. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
234. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
235. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
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of content, and then I briefly address the constitutional requirements under
the Copyright Clause.
A. Pornography
1. Policy and Politics
The first example involves Congress denying copyright for adult
pornography. Policy arguments over pornography are extensive in the
literature.236 I observe only a few here. Against pornography is the
argument that it causes moral harm to society. Pornography, it is argued,
harms the social institutions of marriage and family life;237 objectifies
humans;238 causes harmful treatment of women both generally and in the
pornography-production process specifically;239 provokes bad norms; and
damages children’s moral development.240 If these effects are accurate, they
indicate strong reasons to reduce its proliferation.
Critics of pornography regulation most often rely on a policy argument
of free speech.241 It is argued that speakers and their willing audiences
should be able to engage in their own private conversations, indecent or
otherwise.242 This argument has proven sufficiently strong to merit speech
protection from government censorship, but it is lacking as a reason to
establish copyright protection from private copying. Indeed, the literature
lacks arguments relating to social value that pornography brings to
collective society. From a social-collective perspective, the value of
pornography is absent.
Perhaps a stronger argument against copyright denial is not based on
the merits of pornography, but rather the effect of the denial.243 Professors
Christopher Cotropia and James Gibson have argued that removing

236. E.g., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT
FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1995); George, supra note 215, at 17–18; Koppelman, supra note 217, at 1647–
72; John Copeland Nagle, Pornography as Pollution, 70 MD. L. REV. 939, 940 (2011) (summarizing
arguments of pornography opponents); see also Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography, Morality, and
Harm: Why Miller Should Survive Lawrence, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 611, 637–42 (2008) (reciting
social-science research on pornography effects).
237. See George, supra note 215, at 17–18.
238. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 198, at 213.
239. See MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 16–17.
240. See Koppelman, supra note 217, at 1647.
241. See, e.g., STROSSEN, supra note 236.
242. See generally United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 234–35 (2003) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 602–07 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 961–66 (2010).
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copyright from pornography would likely increase its proliferation.244
Their argument is straightforward: by denying copyright, the law would
decrease front-end creation of pornography only marginally, owing to a
dramatic increase in web-based pornography created by amateur
pornographers who don’t enforce their copyright rights.245 Moreover, by
denying copyright, the law would dramatically increase back-end
dissemination of pornography, as consumers would be able to freely
distribute existent pornography without legal restraint.246 Denying
copyright, then, would seem to only marginally decrease front-end
creation, but dramatically increase back-end dissemination.
To a certain extent, this conclusion makes sense in the context of a
court denying copyright for pornography. In that setting, the court’s denial
would affect the copyright validity for pornography content already
created.247 But the conclusion is dubitable in the context of Congress
denying copyright only prospectively.248 A prospective denial would enable
copyright to continue to restrain copying of existent pornography. The
denial, then, would only decrease the front-end creation of pornography by
creators who rely on copyright, having no effect on back-end copying of
existent pornography, and for that matter, on either front-end creation or
back-end copying of pornography created by amateur pornographers who
don’t rely on copyright. Therefore, under a prospective copyright denial of
pornography, back-end copying would not increase while front-end
creation would decrease. Denying copyright prospectively would seem to
introduce a net decrease in pornography production.249

244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. Cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (denying copyright
for already-existing white pages).
248. A congressional retroactive denial of copyright could raise takings issues that would be
prohibitively costly. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The
Sovereign’s Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 692–93 (1989) (examining takings issue that would arise
if Congress exercised eminent domain over copyrighted works).
249. On the other hand, some pornographers have used copyright to pressure aggregator websites
into policing for unauthorized content, leading the aggregators to adopt policies that excessively block
distribution of all pornographic content—a point raised by Professors Cotropia and Gibson. See
Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 243, at 965–66. This fact suggests that even a prospective denial of
copyright would hinder reducing pornography dissemination. But since the article of Professors
Cotropia and Gibson, this factual premise has been called into doubt. Courts have refrained from
imposing liability on aggregator websites for unauthorized content. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube,
Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 32 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring “actual knowledge or awareness of facts or
circumstances that indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement” for aggregator-website
liability); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“[M]erely hosting a category of copyrightable content, such as music videos, with the general
knowledge that one’s services could be used to share infringing material, is insufficient to meet the
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In the end, however, the actual effect of denying copyright for
pornography cannot be known until Congress does so. For pornography in
particular, the issue is highly circumstantial. So in view of the uncertainty,
the effect of copyright denial on content production should not dictate a
course of action that is contrary to the constitutional presumption of
copyright’s effect. The Copyright Clause relies on the presumption that
content production increases with copyright.250 Unless evidence establishes
a contrary effect, copyright should be denied for pornography.251
From a political standpoint, support for denying copyright to
pornography would likely be strong. Lawmakers are continually criticizing
its proliferation.252 In 2013, for instance, forty-two Senators—Republicans
and Democrats alike—called for an increase in adult-pornography criminal
prosecution.253 Congress also has a history of implementing conditions for
funding programs that restrict pornography dissemination.254 It therefore
seems likely that Congress would find it politically attractive to deny
copyright for pornography.
2. Constitutionality
As discussed in Part II.A.3, a constitutional denial of copyright for
content would necessitate that the designated category be viewpoint
neutral. This is debatable. Pornography as a criterion for copyright denial
seems to target the viewpoint that women should be portrayed in a certain
manner.255 A value-based criterion of content—such as indecent, lewd, or
immoral—would imply that Congress disagrees with the pornographer’s
portrayal of women, or in other words, the message communicated. Such
criteria suggest viewpoint discrimination.256
actual knowledge requirement . . . .”). In view of this reluctance to attach liability for those websites,
copyright law would not seem to introduce an unproductive bottleneck for disseminating pornography.
250. See Snow, supra note 38, at 314.
251. See id. In short, pornography is not the proper vehicle to promote the progress of science, so
copyright is not the proper vehicle to deal with the problems of pornography. Congress should not
employ copyright as a means to resolve social harms of pornography—through either denial or grant. If
pornography causes social harm, let it happen without the copyright subsidy.
252. See Nagle, supra note 236, at 941 n.14 (reciting statements by congressional lawmakers
relating to pornography).
253. See Letter from 42 Senators to Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www.politico.com/static/PPM153_obsc.html.
254. See infra note 257.
255. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461, 463 (1986) (“[A]nti-pornography legislation expressly discriminates on
the basis of viewpoint . . . .”).
256. If Congress were to define pornography as “indecent expression,” the word indecent
suggests that pornographic works are offensive, improper, or undesirable—or in other words, that this
sort of expression is wrong. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 593 n.1 (1998)
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The line between viewpoint and content, however, is never clear.
Pornography may also be considered as a general category of content—
specifically, content that is likely to arouse sexual stimulation or content
that appeals to the prurient interest. Such descriptions do not appear to
target the portrayal of women as much as they target effects that follow
from content. And as between the two constructions of pornography—
viewpoint-based or neutral—the Supreme Court has a history of treating
pornography as viewpoint neutral.257 Denying pornography would likely be
constitutional under the Copyright Clause.
B. Violent Video Games
1. Policy and Politics
On the question of copyright denial for violent video games, policy
arguments are mixed. On the one hand, several studies conclude that
playing such games leads to aggressive behavior, at least in the short
term.258 So for the sake of protecting innocent third parties from that
aggressive behavior, copyright should be denied. On the other hand, other

(Scalia, J., concurring) (assuming that discriminating term “decency” imposes viewpoint). Similarly, if
Congress were to define pornography as expression that portrays women “as submissive in matters
sexual or as enjoying humiliation,” the discriminating criteria would represent disapproval of a
viewpoint about women—an approach expressly rejected by the Seventh Circuit in American
Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985).
257. The Supreme Court allowed Congress to refrain from extending subsidies to pornographic
works in both National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. at 574–75, and United States v.
American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 209 (2003) (plurality). Tellingly, Congress’s definition of
pornography in both these cases could be construed as viewpoint based, i.e., “decency and respect” in
Finley, 524 U.S. at 572, and “harmful to minors” in American Library, 539 U.S. at 201. Under
spending-power doctrine, viewpoint-discriminatory funding is permissible only if Congress is speaking
or transmitting its own message through private speakers. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533, 541 (2001). Neither situation applies in Finley or American Library. Yet in both cases, the Court
upheld the pornography criterion. Finley, 524 U.S. at 589–90; Am. Library, 539 U.S. at 210. Ostensibly,
then, the pornographic criteria were viewpoint neutral. Hence, pornographic works appear likely to
constitute a permissible category of content for which Congress may deny copyright.
258. See, e.g., Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Violent Video Games and Hostile
Expectations: A Test of the General Aggression Model, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1679–86 (2002) (“[T]he present study supports the General Aggression Model–based prediction that
exposure to violent media can influence the amount of aggressive expectations that people conjure up in
response to potential conflict situations.”); Youssef Hasan et al., The More You Play, the More
Aggressive You Become: A Long-Term Experimental Study of Cumulative Violent Video Game Effects
on Hostile Expectations and Aggressive Behavior, 49 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 224–27
(2013) (testing cumulative effect of violent video games and concluding that “aggressive behavior and
hostile expectations increased over days for violent game players, but not for nonviolent video game
players”).
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studies conclude that such games actually reduce crime.259 Potential
criminals apparently vent their aggressive tendencies in virtual reality
rather than in real-space crime situations.260 The evidence, then, does not
seem to dictate a clear policy position on whether Congress should
discourage violent video games.
From a political standpoint, denying copyright for violent video games
would likely garner substantial support. The seeming increase in public
shootings has created significant public outcry against those games.261
Often cited as a contributing factor in the shootings, such games have come
under intense public and political scrutiny.262 And given the political
controversy surrounding gun control, copyright denial seems much more
politically attractive as a means of decreasing violent outbursts.
2. Constitutionality
As discussed above, the Copyright Clause would require viewpoint
neutrality.263 Like pornography, the viewpoint neutrality of violent video
games as a criterion for denying copyright is debatable. Such a criterion
suggests that Congress does not agree with the particular message of
violence. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Supreme Court
recognized that objections to violence in video games constitute objections
to the message itself—not merely the category of content.264 Thus, the
Brown decision presents a formidable challenge to construing a violentvideo-games criterion for discrimination as viewpoint neutral.
Yet despite Brown’s recognition of viewpoint discrimination, the
context of copyright provides a distinct basis for construing a copyright
denial to violent video games as viewpoint neutral. Key to the viewpointneutrality inquiry is the reason that Congress discriminates.265 Under its
copyright power, Congress may identify categories of content that are less
likely to promote the progress of science.266 With regard to video games
259. E.g., A. Scott Cunningham et al., Understanding the Effects of Violent Video Games on
Violent Crime 1 (Apr. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1804959 (“[A] one
percent increase in violent games is associated with up to a 0.03% decrease in violent crime . . . .”).
260.
See Benedict Carey, Shooting in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/science/studying-the-effects-of-playing-violent-video-games.html.
261. See, e.g., Kesten, supra note 1.
262. See id.
263. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
264. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
265. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (examining whether intent of
government is to discourage viewpoint); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
(explaining that “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consideration” in deciding whether
speech is content-based).
266. See discussion supra Parts II–III.
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generally, some types seem less likely to fulfill that purpose than do others.
For instance, games that stimulate audiences through graphic violence
seem much less likely to promote advancement in knowledge than do
scholastic-educational games. Hence, Congress may identify that video
games that have a purpose of stimulating audiences through engaging
participants in graphically violent play are less likely to effect results that
advance knowledge. The designated category of violence may serve to
better identify content that fails to fulfill the mandate of the Copyright
Clause, rather than to communicate disagreement with the message of
violence itself. Thus, denying copyright for that category of video games
could be construed as a viewpoint-neutral exercise of the copyright power.
V. CONCLUSION
Much like the spending power gives Congress power to promote
general welfare through subsidizing activities with money, the copyright
power gives Congress power to promote progress and advancements in
knowledge through subsidizing expression with property rights.267 The
copyright power represents a constitutional tool for Congress to promote
certain content over other content.268 Indeed, the Copyright Clause
mandates that Congress exercise its copyright power solely to promote the
progress of science—a content-based end.269 That mandate provides
sufficient discretion for Congress to extend, deny, or marginally adjust
copyright protection for certain categories of content.270 The text of the
Copyright Clause therefore supports content-based copyright denial.
This interpretation draws support from policy considerations.271
Congress as a collective institution has an advantage over individual
members of the public in assessing the value of content. Congress has
resources and perspectives that reflect collective society; individuals do
not.272 Congress is more likely to account for negative externalities of
expression; consumers are not.273 Congress has means to adjust the
suppression of copying for efficiency of content dissemination; individuals
do not.274 Congress can reduce the copyright term where the standard

267.
Clause).
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See Snow, supra note 3, at 1490–96 (comparing the Spending Clause with the Copyright
See discussion supra Part II.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; discussion supra Part II.A.
See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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length would be wasteful for certain content; individuals cannot.275 In short,
Congress brings a perspective and an ability that individuals lack, which
enables Congress to more effectively attain the collective purpose of
promoting the progress of science.276
Of course there are limitations to this power—just like any other
constitutional power. Doctrinally, Congress may never discriminate against
viewpoints.277 More practically, the absence of copyright does not preclude
creators from creating and even profiting from expression.278 In short, the
copyright power does not give Congress power to forbid creators access to
the financial marketplace. It merely gives Congress a power to deny
creators a government-backed monopoly within that marketplace.
Yet despite these limitations of the copyright power, that power does
represent a means for influencing public discourse. Subject to its
constitutional and practical limitations, the power enables Congress to
further policy ends that depend on expressional content. Thus, the
Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to grant or deny copyright for
content that promotes or impedes the progress of science.

275. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
276. See discussion supra Part III.A.
277. See discussion supra Part II.A.3 (interpreting Copyright Clause as imposing viewpointneutrality restriction on copyright denial); Snow, supra note 3, at 1517–18 (interpreting Free Speech
Clause as imposing viewpoint-neutrality restriction on copyright denial).
278. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.

